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Abstract 
Cost Assessment of Clean Generation Incentives in Mexico for Utility 
Scale Solar Photovoltaic Projects 
Maria F. de la Fuente Gutierrez de Quevedo, M.S.E.E.R. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
Supervisor:  David B. Spence 
Mexico recently opened the electric generation sector to competition. In addition, 
regulations to reach clean generation goals were implemented. These regulations include 
Clean Energy Certificates (CELs) obligations (similar to the Renewable Portfolio 
Standards in the United States), and the obligation of electricity suppliers to go into long 
term contracts with generators to guarantee the required electric energy and CELs supply. 
These contracts are procured through an auction mechanism. The purpose of this research 
is to i) estimate the cost of reaching the goals through the implemented policy, and ii) 
evaluate if the projects could be economically feasible by selling electricity in the short 
term market, without the incentives. This research looked at three different utility scale 
solar photovoltaic projects that will operate under long term contracts for the provision of 
electric energy and CELs. The revenues of the projects under the contract terms were 
modeled and contrasted with projected Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). In addition, a 
discounted cash flow analysis was done for the three projects, both under long term contract 
conditions and short term market conditions.  
 vii 
Two projects were found to be financially feasible under short term market 
conditions. For these projects, the LMP was between $1.34 and $4.03 USD/MWh higher 
than the long term contract price. One project was not feasible under short term market 
conditions. For this project to be feasible in the short term market, the LMPs needed to be 
over $1.49 USD/MWh higher than the projections, while the price paid in the contract for 
this project was approximately $1.29 USD/MWh higher than the projected LMPs. These 
results show that the policy implemented is efficient, provides benefits to customers, and 
in some cases to investors. In the cases where the projects were feasible without the 
incentive, they would have sold their energy for a higher price without the long term 
contract mechanism. In addition, the project that was not financially feasible under short 
term market conditions would have needed a higher premium over the LMP price, than the 
premium achieved through the long term contract. 
 viii 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
In December 2013 Mexico passed a comprehensive energy reform that includes the 
restructuring of the electricity sector. As a result, Mexico implemented a new wholesale 
electricity market on 2016, and opened utility scale electricity generation to competition 
from private generators. Under the restructured market, Transmission and Distribution 
activities (T&D) remain under federal control through the National Center of Energy 
Control (CENACE). CENACE has the obligation to guarantee open and non-
discriminatory access to all market participants (LIE, 2014).  As part of the reform, the 
Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), a vertically integrated federal government 
company in charge of all electricity supply, will undergo a vertical and horizontal 
unbundling process. 
One very important feature of this reform is a serious commitment to climate 
change mitigation. The Electric Industry Law (LIE) enacted on august 2014 defines Clean 
Energy as those processes and sources of electricity whose emissions or residues do not 
exceed the limits established by the corresponding regulation. The Clean Energy forms 
considered in the law include: i) wind, ii) solar radiation, iii) oceanic energy, iv) geothermal 
energy, v) biofuels, vi) methane from waste, vii) hydro power, viii) nuclear, and ix) 
efficient cogeneration that meets the corresponding regulation criteria (LIE, 2014). The 
Energy Transition Law, passed by congress and published in December 2015, mandates 
that Mexico’s Department of Energy (SENER) sets the goal of 35% participation of clean 
technologies in total electricity generation by 2024 (LTE, 2015). 
 The main mechanism to reach the goals will be the Clean Energy Certificates 
(CEL), which will replace previous renewable incentives such as the energy bank, and open 
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season fixed low-cost wheeling charges for wind projects (Watson, et al., 2015). Even 
though the CELs are said to be the only remaining renewable energy incentive, it is 
important to consider that the Income Tax Law (ISR law) still allows the tax payer to deduct 
100% of renewable energy generation or efficient cogeneration machinery and equipment 
investments on the first year (ISR DOF, 2016). The CEL requirement implemented in 
Mexico works in a similar way to the Renewable Energy Certificates under the Required 
Portfolio Standards implemented in the US creating demand for these generation 
technologies. 
In 2015, clean generation technologies in Mexico accounted for around 20% of 
overall electricity generation (PRODESEN, 2016). The CELs requirements will start on 
the year 2018 at 5% of electricity consumption (DOF, 2015). This percentage is to be 
increased in future years to reach the goal of 35% clean electricity consumption by 2024. 
Since then, two long term auctions have taken place in the Mexican electricity market 
where Mexico’s Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), as electricity supplier, has made 
offers to purchase power, energy, and certificates through long term contracts. The two 
main reasons for these auctions are i) to procure the desired market products at competitive 
prices, and ii) to avoid the risks of price fluctuations (PRODESEN, 2016).  
The winners from the First Long Term Auction 2015 placed bids that total 5.4 
million megawatts hour (MWh) of energy per year from solar and wind projects. The bids 
of the winners from the First Long Term Auction 2016 add up to an additional 9.2 million 
MWh of energy per year from a mix of solar, wind, geothermal, and hydropower project 
(CENACE SLP, undated).  
The increase of renewable and Clean Energy generation has some well-known 
benefits. Among these benefits are i) diversifying energy sources by moving away from a 
high exposure to hydrocarbon prices fluctuation, ii) access to local, cheap, and vast 
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renewable sources of energy, iii) improvement of public health, and iv) reduction of green-
house-gas emissions. Even though benefits are readily apparent, it is imperative to estimate 
how much will the newly introduced policy cost. Getting the targeted quantity of Clean 
Energy within the desired timeline entails forcing the market to provide it at an additional 
cost.  
While there is historical data available to estimate capital requirement for installing 
these technologies, estimating how this investment costs will impact energy prices is a 
different story. Having no historic data on CELs, all analysts can do is to come up with 
estimates from models. But given the way energy policy and CEL requirements are being 
implemented in Mexico, there is some concrete information readily available to estimate 
the incremental cost of reaching the Clean Energy goals before they are realized in the 
market. This information consists of the results of the Long Term Auctions published by 
CENACE (CENACE SLP, undated), and the projected Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) 
published in the Development Program of the National Electrical System (PRODESEN) 
by Mexico’s Department of Energy (PRODESEN, 2016).  
1.2 OBJECTIVES 
The present work intends to understand and evaluate the following research 
objectives: 
i) Estimate the cost of reaching the Clean Energy goals through the implemented 
energy policy 
ii) Evaluate if the projects could be economically feasible by competing in the market 
without the aiding regulation. 
iii) Compare the impact that the CEL regulation and long term contract obligations 
have on the economic value of the clean projects in different geographic locations. 
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This research will focus on the analysis of three utility scale photovoltaic (PV) solar 
power plants that are included in Mexico’s Program for the Installation and Retirement of 
Electric Generation Facilities (PIIRCE), and were winner offers in the First 2015 Long 
Term Auction. Each power plant is to be located in a different transmission region, and 
therefore corresponds to a different price zone.   
 
To obtain the cost of reaching Clean Energy goals, the revenues of the projects 
under the contract terms were modeled and contrasted with projected Locational Marginal 
Prices (LMPs). Further, a discounted cash flow analysis was made for the projects, both 
under long term contract conditions and short term market conditions. Based on these 
discounted cash flow analysis, the economic feasibility of the projects and the impact of 
the incentives on their value were evaluated.  
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Chapter 2: Background 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF MEXICO’S ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The National Electric System (SEN) in Mexico is integrated by: i) the National 
Transmission Grid, ii) the General Distribution Grids, iii) the Electric Generation Facilities 
that deliver power to the National Transmission Grid or the General Distribution Grids, 
and iv) other equipment and infrastructure of the CENACE used for the operational control 
of the SEN (LIE, 2014).  
 
National Transmission Grid and General Distribution Grids 
The National Transmission Grid is the system composed of all the electrical 
networks that transport electricity to the General Distribution Grids and to the general 
public, as well as the interconnections to the foreign electric systems. The National 
Transmission Grid is divided into 53 transmission regions, 45 of which are interconnected 
with each other, making up a total of 62 links in the National Interconnected System. The 
remaining 8 transmission regions belong to the isolated systems of the Peninsula of Baja 
California. The 52 transmission regions are illustrated in Figure1. The National 
Transmission Grid is integrated by lines with voltages greater than or equal to 69 kilovolts 
(kV). In 2015, the length of the transmission lines with voltage of 230 and 400 kV was 
53,216 kilometers (km). In addition, the total length of transmission lines with voltage from 
69 kV to 161 kV was 51,178 km (PRODESEN, 2016).  
The General Distribution Grids are used to distribute electricity to the general 
public. These distribution grids are integrated by medium voltage networks with supply at 
levels greater than 1 kV and less than or equal to 35 kV, as well as low voltage networks 
with supply at levels equal to or less than 1 kV. In 2015, the total length of the distribution 
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lines was 775,483 km. There are also 79,413 km of distribution lines with voltage level of 
34.5kV and 311,857 km with voltage level of  13.8 kV (PRODESEN, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 1: Transmission Regions and Capacity of Transmission Lines of the National 
Electric System (SEN) 
Data Source: PRODESEN 2016-2030. (PRODESEN, 2016) 
 
The SEN is divided into 9 regions for planning purposes. Traditionally these 
regions were under the responsibility of 7 control centers located in different states 
coordinated by the CENACE, (CFE, 2007). These 9 regions are called control regions, of 
which 7 are interconnected forming the National Interconnected System. The 
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interconnection of the control regions in Baja California to the National Interconnected 
System is expected to start in 2021.  
 
 shows the electricity consumption in each control region in 2016. The Occidental 
region has the first place in electricity consumption with 23%, while The Central region, 
being the by far the smallest in area, comes in second place with 19% of electricity 
consumption. Mexico’s Department of Energy (SENER) planning scenario considers a 
mean annual growth of electricity consumption in the SEN of 3.4% for the 2016-2030 
period (PRODESEN, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 2: Electricity Consumption by Control Region  
Data Source: SENER, 2016. (PRODESEN, 2016) 
 
Installed Capacity and Generation 
In 2015, the installed capacity of the SEN was 68,044 megawatts (MW). Of the 
overall installed capacity, 71.7% corresponds to conventional technologies and 28.3% to 
13,122 GWh
(5%)
2,546 GWh
(1%)
21,642 GWh
(8%)
23,734 GWh
(8%)
50,114 GWh
(17%)
65,220GWh
(23%)
53,649 GWh
(19%)
46,587 GWh
(16%)
11,617 GWh
(4%)
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what is defined by Mexico’s law as clean technologies.  As evident in Figure 3 and 4, 
Natural Gas Combined Cycle (NGCC) had the largest installed capacity in 2015, providing 
more than half of Mexico’s electricity. The 2015 installed capacity increased 4% from 
2014. In terms of ownership, in 2015 CFE owned 61.6% of  all installed capacity, 
independent power producers owned 19%, and private individuals contributed the 
remaining 19.4% via self-supply, cogeneration, small production, export, own continuous 
uses, generators, distributed generation, and not-interconnected rural systems 
(PRODESEN, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 3: Installed Capacity by Technology on 2015 
Data Source: SENER, 2016 (PRODESEN, 2016) 
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Figure 4: Electricity Generation by technology on 2015 
Data Source: SENER, 2016 (PRODESEN, 2016) 
Generation is more concentrated in north and east States, as shown in Figure 5. In 
2015, 67.6% of the total electricity generated came from the Noreste, Oriental, and 
Occidental control regions. The Norte, Central, Noroeste and Peninsular control regions 
accounted for 25.1% of the generation, and the remaining 7.3% was generated in the 
isolated systems of Baja California and Baja California Sur (PRODESEN, 2016). The 
highest participant technology by far in the Noreste region is NGCC, while in the Oriental 
region Nuclear and Hydropower follow natural gas more closely, as can be seen in  
. 
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Figure 5: Electricity Generation by State 
Figure Source: SENER, PRODESEN 2016-2030, 2016 
 
 
Figure 6: Electricity Generation by Technology and Control Region  
Data Source: SENER, (PRODESEN, 2016) 
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2.2 THE EVOLUTION OF MEXICO’S ELECTRIC SECTOR 
In the early decades of Mexico’s electric industry, generation and provision of 
electricity was predominantly in the hands of few private and vertically integrated 
companies. As a result, there was a monopolistic pricing tendency that led to customer 
protests against high rates. In the 1920’s the government made the first attempt at 
regulation of the electric industry, however, these efforts were not very effective (CEE and 
TEC, 2006).  In addition, by the 1930’s only 38% of the population was serviced, leaving 
behind most rural areas (CFE, undated).  
In response, generation and distribution of electricity was declared to be a public 
utility service by decree in 1933. Additionally, the Federal Government created the Federal 
Electricity Commission (CFE) on 1937, to coordinate a national system for the provision 
of electric energy, and to provide it without purpose of profit (CFE, undated). A process of 
nationalization began in 1944 and culminated in 1960 with the amendment of Article 27 
of the Mexican Constitution (Carreón-Rodriguez, et al., 2003). The constitution now made 
it the exclusive responsibility of the Nation to generate, transmit, and supply electricity. In 
addition, it forbade the granting of concessions to private individuals (DOF, 1960).  
Consequently, the electricity sector in Mexico was a pure national monopoly for 
over 32 years (from 1960 to 1992), with CFE as sole provider of all activities in the 
electricity supply chain, which includes generation, transmission, and distribution. CFE 
served all the territory with one exception, Luz y Fuerza del Centro (LFC), another 
government-owned company that served a few central States in Mexico. This company 
was originally Mexican Light and Power. The federal government changed its name to 
LFC after the decree of 1960. The company was to be dissolved and absorbed by CFE, but 
this did not happen until 2009 because of extreme opposition of unionized workers of the 
company (CEE and TEC, 2006).  
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By 1992, CFE had been struggling to keep pace with rising demand. There had 
been high cross subsidization from industrial customers to residential customers, since 
residential tariffs were politically risky to increase despite rises in fuel costs. This situation, 
coupled with financial crises, motivated small reforms to allow limited private participation 
in electricity generation (CEE and TEC, 2006). The amendment to the Public Utility 
Electricity Service Law (LSPEE) on December 1992 allowed participation on generation 
of electricity from private parties for self-supply, to be sold for export, or to be sold to CFE 
(Decree, 1992). Even under these restricted schemes for private participation, up to 36% 
of the installed capacity in the national electric sector came from private entities in 2013 
(DOF, 2013). 
2.3 MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM 
In December 2013, Mexico passed a comprehensive energy reform that includes 
the restructure of the electricity sector. Under this new regulatory framework, Mexico 
implemented the new wholesale electricity market between the months of January and 
March 2016 (CENACE, undated). The generation sector was opened to competition from 
private generators, while transmission and distribution remain under federal government 
control. The key regulatory elements of this energy reform that pertain to the electric 
industry are the amendments to articles 25, 27 and 28 of the Constitution in December 
2013, and derived secondary laws such as the LIE, and the Federal Electricity Commission 
Law (CFE Law).  
Article 27 now states that the planning and control of the National Electric System 
(SEN), as well as the transmission and distribution of the electricity, is the exclusive 
responsibility of the Mexican federal government. Therefore, no concessions will be 
granted for these activities, notwithstanding that Mexico’s federal government may still go 
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into contracts with private parties to provide this service under the terms established by the 
mexican laws (Decree, 2013). Under the light of other amendments made to regulate and 
penalize monopoly practices, Article 28 paragraph 4 of Mexico’s Constitution was 
amended to state that the strategic activities that are performed by the state in an exclusive 
way will not be considered monopolies. Among these activities are nuclear energy 
generation, planning and control of the SEN, and the transmission and distribution of 
electricity (Decree, 2013). Article 25 was amended to state that the public sector will be 
exclusively in charge of the strategic areas mentioned in article 28 paragraph 4, and 
Mexico’s federal government will maintain ownership and control over the State 
productive companies and organizations established to fulfill these activities.  
A State productive company is a company owned by the federal government that 
participates in the market in the same way as private companies do. The new CFE Law 
makes CFE a State productive company. This Law was enacted by the Mexican Congress 
on August 2014 and encompasses the rules regarding its organization, administrative 
structure, salaries, operation, acquisitions and leases, responsibilities, dividends, budget, 
debt, and reporting obligations (CFE Law, 2014). CFE is given more flexibility to make 
corporate government and business model decisions, as well as being provided with 
budgetary autonomy and increased freedom to negotiate and acquire debt (PwC, 2014).  
The LIE was enacted by the Mexican Congress on August 2014 and establishes the 
foundation principles of the electricity market. The law aims to regulate the planning and 
control of the SEN, the electric energy transmission and distribution service, and all other 
activities of the electric industry. It also looks to promote the sustainable development of 
the electric industry, and to guarantee its continuous, efficient and safe operation that 
benefits its customers. The LIE also intends to ensure compliance with universal public 
service, Clean Energy, and pollutant emission reduction obligations. The LIE gives the 
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Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) the responsibility of establishing the market rules, 
and the CENACE the role of overseeing the market and establishing the market operation 
rules (LIE, 2014). 
2.4 MEXICO’S NEW ELECTRICITY MARKET RULES 
The LIE states that the generation, transmission, distribution, marketing of 
electricity, and supply of primary materials for the electric industry will be carried out in 
an independent manner, and under conditions of strict legal separation. In the same way, 
the Basic Services Supply (electricity service supply under a regulated tariff to users with 
a minimum load of less than 1MW) and other marketing modalities will be separated. It is 
stipulated that SENER will establish the terms of this legal separation and will oversee 
compliance with it. In addition, the LIE gives the CRE the faculty to require the functional, 
accounting, or operative unbundling of the members of the electric industry (LIE, 2014) .  
Privately owned generators that existed under the previous schemes (such as 
Independent Power Producer, cogeneration, self-supply and small generation) can choose 
between continuing under their old roles, or transition to the new generation scheme 
defined in the LIE. Transmission and distribution will be controlled by the CENACE. 
Despite the fact that the law establishes that no concessions will be made regarding 
transmission and distribution, CENACE will still be able to enter into contracts with private 
parties for grid expansion, maintenance and operation. The LIE states that CENACE is in 
charge of “the operational control of the SEN, operating the wholesale electricity market, 
and the open and non-discriminatory access to the national transmission network and the 
general distribution networks”. Additionally, the CRE is in charge of setting the rules for 
the calculation of transmission and distribution fees (LIE, 2014). 
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Electricity generation facilities require a permit if they want to participate in the 
wholesale electricity market as electricity generators, or if they have a generation capacity 
larger than 0.5MW. Facilities that do not require a generation permit are referred to as 
exempt generators. This is the case in two scenarios, i) their capacity is less than 0.5MW, 
or ii) their capacity is destined only for self-supply, emergencies, or for interruptions of the 
electricity supply service. Small generators that do not require a generation permit will be 
able to sell their electricity and controllable demand related products through their 
electricity service suppliers, who will represent them in the market (LIE, 2014).  
Under the new law, Qualified Users are defined as customers with a minimum load 
of 1 MW. These customers can represent themselves in the wholesale market, or be 
represented by a Qualifier Service Supplier. Smaller customers with similar interests will 
be able to aggregate their demand in their load centers to be registered as Qualified Users, 
but they will need to be represented in the wholesale electricity market by a Qualified 
Supplier. On the other hand, Basic Supply is the electricity service provided under a 
regulated tariff to customers that are not Qualified Customers. In the new regulatory 
framework, individuals and businesses can participate in the wholesale electricity market 
in the following roles (LIE, 2014): 
1. Generator: An entity that owns or represents an electric generation facility in the 
wholesale electricity market. 
2. Basic Service Supplier: A supplier that provides electricity, and other services 
needed to satisfy electricity demand to Basic Supply users, and that can represent 
them as exempt generators in the wholesale electricity market. 
3. Qualified Service Supplier: A supplier that provides electricity, and other services 
needed to satisfy electricity demand to Qualified Users under a competition regime, 
and can represent them in the wholesale electricity market as exempt generators.. 
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4. Last Resource Supplier: A supplier of electric services at maximum prices when a 
Qualified Supplier fails to deliver such services. The rules for the determination of 
maximum prices to be charged by the last-resource suppliers will be established by 
the CRE. 
5. Non-supplier Marketer: Is a market participant that has a permit to carry out 
marketing activities but is not a Supplier.  
6. Market Participant Qualified Users:  Customers with a minimum 1 MW load that 
represent themselves in the wholesale electricity market.  
 
CFE and other Generators will be able to sell their electricity in the short-term 
wholesale market, or enter into bilateral contracts with Suppliers and Qualified Users 
through competitive, non-regulated tariffs. Basic Service Suppliers, on the other hand, will 
be able to offer services to Basic Service users under regulated tariffs. The rules for 
calculation of regulated tariffs will be set by the CRE. Basic Suppliers can only enter into 
bilateral electric coverage contracts through the auctions to be performed by the CENACE 
(LIE, 2014). Figure 7 illustrates the structure of the wholesale electricity market. 
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Figure 7: Wholesale Electric Market Structure 
Figure Source: Adapted from CENACE, Mercado y Operaciones, undated, (CENACE, 
undated a) 
The new regulatory framework delineates the specific responsibilities of Mexico’s 
energy related agencies (e.g. SENER, CRE, and CENACE). Some main responsibilities of 
SENER are (i) designing and coordinating the country's electric energy policy, (ii) 
directing the formulation of the development plan of the SEN, (iii) creating a committee, 
in coordination with the CRE, for the evaluation of the performance of the CENACE and 
the wholesale electricity market, (iv) establishing the criteria and requirements for CELs, 
and (v) coordinating and supervising the transformation of CFE into a productive state 
company (LIE, 2014) (PwC, 2014). Some main responsibilities of the CRE are (i) 
regulating and granting electricity generation permits, and providing model 
interconnection contracts, (ii) emitting and applying tariff regulation for the transmission, 
distribution, operation of basic services, among others, (iii) issuing of the bases of the 
wholesale electricity market, and monitoring of its operation, (iv) verifying compliance 
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with the CEL requirements, (v) establishing requirements for Qualified Suppliers and keep 
the registry of such users, and (vi) expediting the regulation on efficiency and quality of 
the SEN (LIE, 2014) (PwC, 2014). 
Some main responsibilities of CENACE are (i) controlling the transmission and 
distribution lines and establishing the guidelines for the operators, (ii) operating the 
wholesale electricity market, as well as the setting and revising of its operating provisions, 
(iii) determining the economic dispatch of electric generation facilities, (iv) carrying out 
auctions for electrical coverage contracts between generators and representatives of load 
centers, and (v) calculating the contributions that the interested parties must make for the 
construction, expansion or modification of transmission and distribution networks when 
the costs are not recovered through regulated tariffs, and vi) formulating the plans for 
expansion and modernization of the national transmission grid, and for the elements of the 
distribution grid that correspond to the wholesale electricity market (LIE, 2014) . 
 
CFE in the New Electricity Market 
The new laws mandate vertical and horizontal unbundling of CFE to foster fair 
competition in the new market (Figure 8). The activities of generation, transmission, 
distribution, and marketing within the CFE will observe a strict vertical separation, which 
must be a legal type separation. Legal horizontal unbundling of generation business units 
is also required. The distribution activity must observe a horizontal separation by regions, 
which may be accounting, operational and functional, or legal (LIE, 2014) . Figure 9 
illustrates the new structure of the CFE as a state productive company. 
 
 19 
 
Figure 8: Comision Federal de Electricidad CFE vertical and horizontal unbundling 
 
 
Figure 9: New Structure of CFE - State Productive Company. 
Figure Source: Adapted from CFE Webpage (CFE, undated b) 
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With respect to the development of new power plants, CFE may participate in new 
projects through itself, subsidiaries, companies in which it participates in a minority way, 
directly or indirectly, or through any partnership or alliance that is not contrary to the law. 
Marketing activity within the CFE must observe a strict legal vertical separation. As in the 
case of generation, marketing can be carried out through subsidiaries and other associations 
in which the CFE does not have a 100% participation (PwC, 2014).  
2.5 CLEAN ENERGY GOALS AND CLEAN ENERGY CERTIFICATES 
The LIE introduces the Clean Energy obligations that will be established to fulfill 
the policies for energy diversification, energy security, and promotion of Clean Energy 
sources (LIE, 2014). The obligations for clean generation will be implemented through a 
system similar to the Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) implemented in the US.  
According to the guidelines set by SENER, CELs are given to new facilities or 
generation capacity additions that meet the clean energy criteria. Qualifying generators will 
have the right to receive the certificates for a period of 20 years. The market will establish 
the value of the CELs and each one will represent 1 MWh of energy generated and 
delivered. The market participants required to comply with clean energy goals are i) 
Suppliers, ii) Qualified Users, iii) Final Users receiving energy through isolated supply, 
and iv) holders of Interconnection Contracts under previous regulation. Obliged parties 
will have to prove compliance every three months and will be able to buy CELs for this 
purpose (SENER, 2016a) (CRE, undated). CELs will be traded through contracts, in the 
CEL market operated by CENACE, through long-term auctions organized by CENACE, 
or in an annual settlement. 
Penalties for not complying with CEL requirements are set by the CRE. The 
sanctions will be calculated as a function of i) significance of the infraction, ii) economic 
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ability to pay, with penalties of up to 50 minimum wages per MWh of non-fulfilled 
obligations, iii) incidence, and iv) other elements of the gravity of the infraction. Frequency 
of incompliance will be taken into account, making the sanctions higher as incidence 
increases (CRE, 2015a). In 2015, Mexico generated 20.3% of electricity through clean 
energy (PRODESEN, 2016). The Clean Energy requirement will start at 5% of energy 
purchased in 2018 (SENER, 2015), aiming for a 25% participation of Clean Energy. This 
percentage is to be increased in future years to reach the goal of 35% clean electricity 
consumption by 2024 (CRE, undated).  
2.6 MEXICO’S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL ELECTRIC SYSTEM 
(PRODESEN) 
The Development Program of the National Electric System (PRODESEN) is 
published by SENER as an instrument for the planning of generation, transmission and 
distribution activities. The PRODESEN is meant to be the fundamental basis for defining 
the projects that the transmission and distribution operators will carry out. This plan is a 
result of the coordination of the Indicative Program for the Installation and Retirement of 
Electric Generation Facilities (PIIRCE) with the Expansion and Modernization Program of 
the National Transmission Grid (PAMRNT) and General Distribution Grids (PRODESEN, 
2016).  
The PIIRCE is the result of a long-term planning exercise to find the combination 
of new generation investments that minimizes the total cost (investment and operation) of 
the SEN needed to meet the forecasted demand and to comply with Clean Energy 
objectives. Minimum Clean Energy shares of 25% for 2018, 30% for 2021, and 35% for 
2024 of the generation of electricity are used constraints in the PIIRCE model 
(PRODESEN, 2016). The PIIRCE 2016-2030 is meant to be a reference of the capacities 
by type of technology and geographical location of the new generation units needed to 
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satisfy electricity demand and Clean Energy goals. The PIIRCE model considers the 
following inputs (PRODESEN, 2016): 
• Forecasted Demand, considering assumptions for future population, electricity 
prices, transmission losses, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The model 
assumes that the gross electric energy consumption is expected to grow on average 
3.4% per year. Peak demand is generally expected to grow faster than non-peak 
demand. Hourly projected demand by hour by control region can be found in 
Appendix A. The projected demand per control region used for the elaboration of 
the PIIRCE is shown in Figure 11. 
• Transmission constraints under maximum demand conditions. 
• Current and future pipeline infrastructure with respect to availability of natural gas 
for electricity generation, guided by the 5-year plan developed by CENAGAS on 
2015. 
• Expected evolution of the GDP, considering an average annual growth of 4.1%. 
• Forecasted fuel prices based on estimations of PIRA Energy Group and according 
to official methodologies emitted by the CRE (Figure 10). 
o Coal: Annual average growth of 3.8%  
o Fuel oil: Annual average growth of 5% 
o Crude oil: Annual average growth of 4.3% for West Texas Intermediate, 4.7% 
for Brent, 4.9% for Mexican Mix for Exports. 
o Diesel: Annual average growth of 3.2% 
o Natural Gas: Annual average growth of 2.6%, and a 3.3% annual average 
growth for liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
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Figure 10: Projected fuel Prices 2016-2030. Planning Scenario. (Base index 2015 = 100) 
Figure Source: SENER, PRODESEN 2016-2030, 2016. (PRODESEN, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 11: Projected Annual Demand by Control Region 
Data Source: SENER, Base de datos de demanda horaria para PIIRCE 2016-2030, 2016. 
(SENER, 2016b) 
For different control regions, peak demand occurs at different moments in the year. 
This is mainly due to differences in temperatures and specific uses of electricity between 
regions. All control regions reach their peak demand during summer, with the exception of 
the Central region, which reaches its peak load on winter when extensive heating is 
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required (PRODESEN, 2016). Furthermore, the projected demand database published by 
SENER indicates that overall maximum demand is expected to grow at different speeds 
between control regions as illustrated in Figure 12 (SENER, 2016b). 
 
 
Figure 12: Projected Maximum Demand by Control Region 
Data Source: SENER, Base de datos de demanda horaria para PIIRCE 2016-2030, 2016. 
(SENER, 2016b) 
According to the PIIRCE 2016-2030 model, the projected additional capacity 
required will be comprised of 38% conventional technologies and 62% clean technologies. 
Among conventional technologies natural gas combined cycle is the largest. Of the clean 
technologies, wind has the lead, followed by efficient cogeneration and solar technologies 
(both PV and concentrated solar). The expected participation of each technology in the 
required additional capacity estimated for the years 2016 to 2030 is illustrated in Figure 
13. In addition, Figure 14 shows the amount of additional capacity expected to be installed 
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by State in the period 2016-2030 (PRODESEN, 2016), with the highest capacity additions 
in the States of Sonora, Veracruz, and Oaxaca.  
 
 
Figure 13: Participation of each technology in additional capacity for 2016-2030 
Data Source: SENER, PRODESEN 2016-2030, 2016 (PRODESEN, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 14: Map of additional capacity by State derived from PIIRCE 2016-2030 
Figure Source: SENER, PRODESEN 2016-2030, 2016. (PRODESEN, 2016) 
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Based on these plans, SENER modeled and published the projected hourly 
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) for each of the 52 zone prices that correspond to the 
transmission regions considered for the PIIRCE. LMPs are the result of an economic 
dispatch model that minimizes the system costs through the optimal dispatch of generation 
units to satisfy demand, subject to the system operational restrictions (e.g. power ramps, 
variable costs, efficiencies, available capacity, and system losses). The main inputs for the 
calculation of the LMPs are (SENER, 2016c):  
• PIIRCE 2016-2030 
• PAMRNT 2016-2030 
• Projections of gross electricity demand of the SEN elaborated by CENACE 
• Estimates of natural gas prices, considering only the variable costs of the fuel, and 
the use of both Mexican and American pipelines 
 
2.7 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND REGULATION  
In March 2016, the CRE emitted requirements for Basic Suppliers and Qualified 
Suppliers to enter into long-term electric supply contracts with respect to capacity, energy, 
and CELs, establishing as well the minimum amounts to be included in these contracts. 
Each year, the Suppliers of Qualified Services and Basic Services shall estimate their 
demand for energy, power and Clean Energy Certificates (CEL) for each of the following 
18 calendar years and enter into coverage contracts for the required percentage of their 
estimated demand of the three products (CRE, 2015b). 
Table 1 shows the percentage of forecasted energy, capacity and CELs that Basic 
Suppliers are required to ensure through these contracts. For the first 3 years, Basic 
Suppliers will be required to purchase 100% of the CEL requirement, energy, and capacity 
that their customers will need according to their own projections.  
 27 
Table 1: Required percentages of the estimated demand for Basic Suppliers 
Year Energy Capacity CEL 
1 100% 100% 100% 
2 100% 100% 100% 
3 100% 100% 100% 
4 CEL amount 90% 90% 
5 to 6 CEL amount 0.7 0.7 
7 to 9 CEL amount 70% 50% 
10 to 12 CEL amount 30% 30% 
13 to 18 CEL amount 30% 30% 
 Table Source: (CRE, 2015b) 
As shown in Table 2, Qualified suppliers are required to cover 60% of their 
projected demand of energy, capacity and CELs for the first three years. 
Table 2: Percentage of demand required for Qualified Suppliers 
Year Energy Capacity CEL 
1 to 3 60% 60% 60% 
4 to 6 CEL amount 50% 50% 
7 to 9 CEL amount 40% 40% 
10 to 12 CEL amount 30% 30% 
13 to 18 CEL amount 0.2 0.2 
Table Source: (CRE, 2015b) 
 
CENACE is carrying out auctions as the mechanism by which the entities 
responsible for load can enter into contracts in a competitive and prudent way to meet the 
needs of capacity, cumulative electrical energy, and CELs. Such entities may participate in 
medium and long term auctions through the following roles (CENACE, undated b): 
i) Basic Service Provider. 
ii) Supplier of Qualified Services. 
iii) Supplier of Last Resort. 
iv) Qualified User Market Participant. 
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Long term auctions have the following three objectives (CENACE, undated b): 
i) to enable Basic Service Providers to enter into contracts in a competitive and 
prudent manner to meet the needs of capacity, cumulative electrical energy, and CELs that 
they must cover through long term contracts in accordance with the requirements 
established by the CRE; 
ii) to allow the other entities responsible for load to participate in them when they 
choose to do so, to enter into contracts for quantities of products in proportion to the 
portfolio of capacity, cumulative electric energy and CELs that is to be obtained for the 
Basic Service Providers; and 
iii) to allow those who enter into these contracts, as sellers, to have a stable source 
of payments that contributes to support the financing of the efficient investments required 
to develop new Power Plants or to revitalize existing ones. 
The terms of the contracts derived from the long term auctions will be of 15 years 
for capacity and cumulative electric energy, and 20 years for CELs (CENACE, undated b). 
Two long term auctions have taken place in the Mexican wholesale electricity market 
where CFE in the role of electric service supplier has offered to buy capacity, energy, and 
certificates. In the first 2015 long term auction the average price of energy plus CELs was 
47.48 USD per (MWh+CEL). Prices of energy and certificates were bundled in the offers 
of this auction. Price averaged 55.39 USD for wind projects, and 45.15 USD for solar 
projects. The results of the 2015 auction are summarized in Figure 15 and Table 3 
(PRODESEN, 2016). According to the auction rules, the exchange rate used to evaluate 
the offers received is the FIX exchange rate published by BANXICO 5 days before the 
offers were presented, that is 17.4 pesos per U.S. dollar. All projects are scheduled to start 
operations in 2018 (BasesSLP, 2016). On this first auction, 93.9% of the energy offers 
came from solar PV projects, and the remaining 6.1% came from wind projects.  
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Table 3: Summary of winner offers of the first Long Term Auction 2015 
 
Data Source: SENER and CENACE, 2016. (PRODESEN, 2016) (CENACE, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 15: Map of winner projects of the first long term auction 2015 
Figure Source: SENER with data from CENACE, PRODESEN 2016-2030, 2016 
(PRODESEN, 2016) 
 
 Name of project Availability Energy  (MWh/year)
CELs 
(CEL/year)
Offered Price
(MXN/year) Technology
Transmission 
Region / Price 
Zone
Capacity
 (MW)
 Energía Renovable de la Peninsula 23-Mar-18 275,502      275,502      314,423,955$ Wind 42-Merida 90.0
 PE el Cortijo 1-Sep-18 585,731      585,731      434,699,412$ Wind 14-Reynosa 168.0
 Parque Eolico Chacabal 28-Mar-18 113,199      113,199      117,085,926$ Wind 42-Merida 30.0
 Parque Eolico Tizimin 27-Sep-18 291,900      291,900      338,331,511$ Wind 42-Merida 76.0
 Parque Eolico Chacabal II 28-Mar-18 117,689      117,689      121,730,100$ Wind 42-Merida 30.0
 Sol de Insurgentes 30-Jun-18 60,965        60,518        50,500,753$   PV Solar 50-Villa Constitucion23.0
 Parque solar don Jose 25-Sep-18 539,034      539,034      421,005,400$ PV Solar 30-Queretaro 207.0
 Guajiro 2 1-Aug-18 269,155      263,815      209,932,823$ PV Solar 30-Queretaro 100.0
 Aguascalientes potencia 1 20-Sep-18 140,970      140,970      116,936,169$ PV Solar 24-Aguascalientes 63.0
 Las viborillas 28-Sep-18 277,490      277,490      226,975,665$ PV Solar 24-Aguascalientes 100.0
 Concunul 28-Sep-18 176,475      176,475      178,133,177$ PV Solar 42-Merida 70.0
 San Ignacio 6-Jun-18 48,748        48,748        53,447,999$   PV Solar 42-Merida 18.0
 Kambul 1-Jan-18 54,975        53,477        64,307,962$   PV Solar 42-Merida 30.0
 Ticul 1 1-Aug-18 740,135      725,450      727,122,881$ PV Solar 42-Merida 500.0
 Parque Solar Villanueva 3 25-Sep-18 737,998      737,998      489,680,736$ PV Solar 11-Laguna 250.0
 Parque Solar Villanueva 25-Sep-18 972,915      972,915      597,503,346$ PV Solar 11-Laguna 330.0
Average	Price:	47.48USD per	package	(MWH+CEL)
§ Wind	55.39	USD
§ Solar	45.15	USD
COAHUILA
2	projects
1,710,913	MWh/year
36.93	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
TAMAULIPAS
2	projects
585,731	MWh/year
42.9	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
YUCATAN
4 wind	projects
798,290	MWh/year	
63.14	usd/MWh+CEL
5	PV	solar	projects
1,020,333MWh/year
61.15	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
BAJA	CALIFORNIA	SUR
1 project
60,965	MWh/year
48.06	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
AGUASCALIENTES
1 project
140,970	MWh/year
47.95	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
JALISCO
1 project
277,490	MWh/year
47.28	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
GUANAJUATO
2	projects
808,189	MWh/year
44.8	usd/MWh+CEL
(Average	 unitary	price)
Source:	Prepared	by	SENER	with	data	from	CENACE,	2016
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The second long term auction took place in 2016. This auction resulted in contracts 
that total 8.9 million MWh of energy, 9.3 million CELs, and 1,187MW of capacity per 
year. The average price for the long term auction 2016 was 33.47 USD per package 
(MWh+CEL). In this auction several bids presented a separate price for energy and 
certificates (CENACEc, 2016). The winning power plants are required to start operations in 
2019 (BasesSLP, 2016).  
Table 4: Products acquired through the first Long Term auction 2016 by technology 
Table Source: Adapted from Transparencia Mexicana (TM, 2016)  
Power (MW) Energy (MWh) CELs Power Energy CELs
Solar 184 4,836,597 4,933,382 16% 54% 53%
Wind 128 3,874,458 3,828,757 11% 43% 41%
Geothermal 25 198,764 198,764 2% 2% 2%
Hydropower - - 314,631 0% 0% 3%
NG Combined Cycle 850 - - 72% 0% 0%
Total 1,187 8,909,819 9,275,534 100% 100% 100%
Products assigned per Technology Participation per TechnologyTechnology
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Chapter 3.  Methodology 
The methodology followed to achieve the research objectives is illustrated in 
Figure 16.  Two different models were developed for the three utility scale PV solar 
projects, shown in Table 5, that were chosen for this analysis. The first model calculates 
the future revenue of the projects under the long term contracts scenario, and under the 
short term market scenario. The second model calculates the net present value of the 
projects under both scenarios using a discounted cash flow analysis. In both scenarios the 
project lifetime is assumed to be 30 years. Each of the solar projects is to be located in a 
different transmission region or price zone, and will be subject to different resource 
characteristics depending on its location. The Offered Price shown in the Table 5 is 
expressed in Mexican Pesos (MXN) and corresponds to the bid price, or sale offer price, 
of the electric energy plus CELs to be delivered per year. The offered price corresponds to 
the two bundled products. This is the price that, adjusted according to the rules of the long 
term contracts explained in section 3.1.2, will be paid by CFE in the role of service supplier 
under the corresponding electric supply contract to the generation project sponsor. The 
offers of the past auctions were indexed to US dollars, so the future prices modeled for this 
research depend on projections of the peso-dollar exchange rate. 
The amount of CELs and the amount of energy offered matches for most projects. 
In the Ticul1 project offer there is a difference of 2% between the amount of certificates 
and the amount of energy. The reason for this difference is not clear. The offer is made in 
the form of an annual price that corresponds to the amount of each product offered per 
year, even if the amount of the two products does not match. In strict sense, the project 
could sell that 2% of certificates in the spot market or to an industrial customer, and get an 
income additional to the income from the long term contract. Nevertheless, the difference 
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is so small that it is not taken into account in the calculations pertaining this research, as it 
has little impact on the overall revenues. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Methodology chart 
Table 5: Projects considered in analysis 
 
Data Source: PIIRCE 2016-20130 and databases published by SENER (SENER, undated), and the results 
from the First Long Term Auction 2015 (CENACE SLP, undated). 
The location of the three projects within the National Interconnected System is 
shown Figure 17.  The Villanueva project site is located in the Norte Control Region, in 
the Viesca municipality in the State of Coahuila (Milenio, 2017). The don Jose solar PV 
Sponsor Name of Project Operations Start Date
 Energy 
(MWh/year)
CELs 
(CEL/year)
Offered Price 
(MXN/year)
Capacity 
(MW)
Enel Green Power Mexico Parque Solar Don Jose 25-Sep-18 539,034       539,034          421,005,400$      207
Vega Solar 1 Ticul 1 1-Aug-18 740,135       725,450          727,122,881$      500
Enel Green Power Mexico Parque Solar Villanueva 25-Sep-18 972,915       972,915          597,503,346$      330
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project is to be located in the Occidental Control Region, in the municipality of San Luis 
de la Paz, in the State of Guanajuato (El Economista, 2017). Lastly, the Ticul 1 project will 
be built in the Peninsular Control Region, in the Ticul Municipality, State of Yucatán 
(BNamericas, undated). According to the solar resource map provided by the National 
Inventory of Renewable Energies (INERE) the three projects are located in high insolation 
areas. The Don José project has the highest solar resource with 6 to 6.5 kilowatt-hour per 
meter square per day (kWh/m2/day) of Global Horizontal Irradiance, followed by the 
Villanueva project with 5.5 to 6 kWh/m2/day, and the Ticul project with 5 to 5.5 
kWh/m2/day (INERE, undated). 
 
Figure 17: Solar resource map, price zones, and selected solar projects  
Data Source: INERE, SENER and CENACE (PRODESEN, 2016) (CENACE, 2016) 
(INERE, undated) 
The annual average projected LMPs of the three Price Zones (PZ) that correspond 
to the three projects are shown in Figure 18. The Villanueva project corresponds to the La 
Vilanueva
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USD$30.65 USD$30.49
Norte	Control	
Region
Occidental	
Control	
Region
Peninsular	
Control	
Region
Price Zones
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Laguna PZ, the Don José project corresponds to the Querétaro PZ, and the Ticul 1 project 
corresponds to the Mérida PZ. It can be seen that the prices in La Laguna are expected to 
be lower than the other two zones.  
 
Figure 18: Average annual LMPs for 2016–2032 in the Laguna, Mérida, and Querétaro 
price zones. 
Data Source: SENER, 2016 (SENER, 2016d) 
 
Looking at intra-day variation of LMPs in La Laguna in summer and winter on 
Figure 19 we can evaluate how well prices align with generation of the Villanueva project. 
During summer, the higher prices during day, between 11am and 7pm, fall within the PV 
solar generation interval. In the winter, although peak prices occur in the evening, there is 
a second relatively high price interval between 9am and 3pm that could help the 
profitability of PV solar installations. 
 The La Laguna transmission region, or zone price, is located in the Norte control 
region. Comparing the winter LMP curve in La Laguna and the load curve in the Norte 
control region also shown in Figure 19, we can confirm that prices follow the demand curve 
in winter. Overall, PV solar generation matches the current peak demand around 4:30pm. 
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If enough PV solar comes online, the new peak could be pushed to 10pm. This can be 
confirmed by looking at the comparison between the intra-day load curve and net load 
curve (load net of generation from the Villanueva project) in Figure 20. Looking at the load 
curves in winter, it can be observed that load starts hiking up quickly around 7pm, close to 
the time new PV solar generation will fade. This effect is amplified in the net load curve. 
  
Figure 19: Left: LMPs intra-day La Laguna price zone, 2016; Right: Load curve Norte 
Control Region, 2016 
Data Source: Elaborated with LMP and Hourly Demand databases from SENER. 
(SENER, 2016d) 
 
  
Figure 20: Left: Winter Load and Net Load*; Right: Summer Load and Net Load* Norte 
Control Region, 2016 
Data Source: Elaborated Hourly Demand databases from SENER (SENER, 2016d), and 
project generation modeled using NREL’s System Advisory Model 
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The LMPs for the Mérida transmission region are displayed in Figure 21 below. 
This is the price zone that corresponds to the Ticul 1 project. During the winter, prices are 
the highest between 3:30 pm and 6 pm, which will align with a portion of the Ticul project 
generation window. In the summer, prices peak around 11pm, but the second highest peak 
occurs approximately at 4:30 pm within the PV solar generation window. The overall peak 
demand in the Peninsular control region takes place in the evenings. As Ticul generation 
fades, other generators will need to ramp up more quickly to keep up with the rapid climb 
in demand in the end of the winter days as shown in  Figure 22. 
 
  
Figure 21: Left: LMPs intra-day Mérida price zone, 2016; Right: Load curve Peninsular 
Control Region, 2016 
Data Source: Elaborated with LMP and Hourly Demand databases from SENER. 
(SENER, 2016d) 
 
-
50.00	
100.00	
150.00	
200.00	
250.00	
300.00	
350.00	
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
28.40
28.60
28.80
29.00
29.20
29.40
29.60
29.80
30.00
30.20
30.40
Ti
cu
lp
ro
je
ct
	g
en
er
at
io
n
[M
W
]
Hour
LM
Ps
M
erida
Price
Zone,	2016	
[USD/M
W
h]
Intra-day	LMPs	2016	Merida	price	zone		
Vs	Ticul 1	Project	Generation
Winter	LMPs	- Merida Summer	LMPs	- Merida
Winter	- Ticul	Generation Summer	- Ticul	Generation
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
800
900
1,000
1,100
1,200
1,300
1,400
1,500
1,600
1,700
1,800
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23
PV
 S
ys
te
m
 P
ow
er
 G
en
er
at
ed
[M
W
]
Av
er
ag
e 
Ho
ur
ly
 D
em
an
d
in
 2
01
6 
[M
W
]
Hour
Hourly Demand Vs. PV Generation 
Peninsular Control Region
Summer Average Hourly Demand Winter Average Hourly Demand
Summer Average PV Generation Winter Average PV Generation
 37 
  
Figure 22: Left: Winter Load and Net Load*; Right: Summer Load and Net Load* 
Peninsular Control Region, 2016 
Data Source: Elaborated Hourly Demand databases from SENER (SENER, 2016d), and 
project generation modeled using NREL’s System Advisory Model. 
 
The LMPs for the Querétaro Transmission Region are shown in Figure 23. The Don 
Jose project corresponds to this price zone. As in the other regions, lower prices occur 
roughly between midnight and sunrise. In this price zone prices in winter are generally 
higher than in the summer, in contrast with the La Laguna and Mérida price zones. 
Generation from the Don Jose project will help address peak demand, which occurs in the 
summer, as can be seen in Figure 24. 
  
Figure 23: Left: LMPs intra-day Querétaro price zone, 2016; Right: Load curve 
Occidental Control Region, 2016 
Data Source: Elaborated with LMP and Hourly Demand databases from SENER. 
(SENER, 2016d) 
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Figure 24: Left: Winter Load and Net Load*; Right: Summer Load and Net Load*  
Occidental Control Region, 2016 
Source: Elaborated Hourly Demand databases from SENER (SENER, 2016d), and 
project generation modeled using NREL’s System Advisory Model. 
 
 While PV solar generation aligns well in general with current the rises in load 
during day time, it also phases out around the time when demand starts to grow. It will be 
important to analyze how this will affect reliability, as load could increase at a faster rate 
than other generation sources can turn online. This acceleration of the evening hike in 
demand can be seen already with just the offset of this projects in the Norte and Peninsular 
control regions in winter (Figure 20 and Figure 22). A similar phenomenon has been 
observed in some places with high PV solar penetration.  For example, in  California the 
net load (difference between load and variable generation)  has received the name “duck 
curve”, since the valley in mid-afternoon load that ramps up around sunset time looks like 
the neck on a duck (California ISO, 2016). Practical solutions have been already studied 
and proposed in other parts of the world. Mexico can learn from this experience and plan 
ahead for the best ways to address this integration issue. 
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3.1 REVENUE MODEL  
The first goal of this research is to estimate the cost of reaching the Clean Energy 
goals through the implemented energy policy. This cost was estimated by subtracting (a) 
the real weighted LMP per year, from (b) the projected price, or amount of money that the 
projects will receive under the long-term electricity coverage contracts per year divided by 
electricity generated and delivered per year. For the purpose of this research it is assumed 
that there will be no curtailment of energy. 
To calculate (a) the real weighted LMP, the analysis used the projected hourly 
LMPs derived from the PIIRCE and published by SENER (SENER, 2016d). The LMPs 
were weighted based on the hourly generation modeled by SAM. Next, an annual weighted 
average LMP was calculated for each year. The weighted average LMP was then adjusted 
for inflation using the National Producer Prices Index with services and without oil 
published by INEGI (INEGI, undated). The LMPs correspond to the year 2016 to 2033, 
and the project life extends to year 2036. A three year moving average was used to forecast 
the hourly LMPs for the year 2033 to 2048. Equation (1) shows the calculation for annual 
weighted LMP, and Equation (2) shows the adjustment of LMPs for inflation. 
(1)     Weighted	av. LMP/ = [LMP2,4		x	267,89:26; (E2,4/𝑇𝐸/)]  
Where: Weighted av. LMPi: weighted average LMP for year i 
LMPh,i :Locational Marginal Price of hour h, and year i 
Eh,i: Electric energy produced in hour h, and year i 
TEi: Total energy generated in year i 
i: 1 to 30 years 
h: 1 to 8,760 hours in each year 
(2)     WALMPi = 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑎𝑣. 𝐿𝑀𝑃/	x	 OPQQ	ROPQQ	RST 
Where: WALMPi : Weighted Adjusted LMP in year i 
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 INPP i: Average National Index of Producer Prices in year i 
INPP i-1: Average National Index of Producer Prices in year i -1 
i:1 to 30 years 
The offered price cannot be compared directly to the LMPs since the payments of 
electricity under the contract are more complex than multiplying the unitary offered price 
times the energy delivered. The long term contract lasts 20 years, and the project is assumed 
to last 30 years. Therefore, to calculate (b) the projected price per MWh of electricity, the 
revenue for the first 20 years of the project under the contract was divided by the amount 
of electricity in MWh delivered (3). For the last ten years of the project life, energy will be 
sold in the short term market; therefore, the price will be the same as in (2) (4). 
 
(3)     Projected	Price/ = 	YZ[Z\]Z^	]\_Z`	ab\c	dZ`e	fb\d`gfdhijk	bl	Z\Z`cm	_Za/[Z`Z_	h  
for i: 1 to 20 years 
(4)       Projected	Price/ = WALMP/ 
for i: 21 to 30 
Finally, the cost of reaching Clean Energy goals through the implemented policies 
for the project is obtained with equation (5) for each year. Afterwards, the results of 
equation (5) is brought to present value by discounting each value using the social discount 
rate (used to calculate value of public infrastructure projects in Mexico), and averaging 
the discounted values. The social rate is currently 10% and it is published by Mexico’s 
ministry of finance. 
(5) Cost	of	policy	/ = Projected	Price/−WALMP/ 
for i: 1 to 30 years 
Both the revenues under the long term contract and the weighted average LMPs 
depend on the amount of energy and CEL’s generated and sold by the projects. Under the 
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terms of the long term contracts, the projects will sell electric energy for 15 years, and 
CELs for 20 years. The last 10 years the project will be selling energy at LMPs. 
3.1.1 Resource and Energy Assumptions 
 The estimation of energy generation of the three utility scale PV solar projects was 
obtained using the System Advisor Model (SAM), a simulation tool developed by the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). SAM models hour-by-hour electric 
output of the power system, and generates hourly values of the system’s electricity 
production over a single year (Nate Blair, 2014). SAM has built in assumptions for losses 
derived from the different components of the solar array (e.g. soiling loss, inverter power 
consumption loss, inverter efficiency loss, inverter clipping loss, AC wiring loss, DC 
wiring loss, and DC module loss). Default settings for efficiency and losses were used to 
model the generation of the solar arrays. Since SAM provides generation data for one year, 
a 0.5% reduction of generation per year was assumed to model the generation of the 
following years. 
The resource information used by the SAM model comes from NREL’s National 
Solar Radiation Database (NSRDB). According to the NSRDB webpage the current 
version was developed using the Physical Solar Model (PSM) which was developed by 
NREL in collaboration with the University of Wisconsin, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Solar Consulting Services (NREL, undated a). 
The data for Mexico and Central America has a temporal resolution of 30 minutes, spatial 
resolution of 4 X 4 kilometers, and uses data from 1998 to 2014 (NREL, undated b). The 
meteorological data is derived from the NASA Modern Era-Retrospective Analysis 
(MERRA) datasets. PSM takes into account cloudy conditions using the cloud properties 
retrieved from satellites to calculate surface radiation (NREL, undated a).  
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The following assumptions were chosen from the SAM model database for the 
components and characteristics of the solar installations: 
• Modules: SunPower SPR-X22-475-COM 
o max power: 476.495 Watts DC 
o module area: 2.162 m2 
o material: Mono-c-Si 
o nominal efficiency: 22.0395% 
• Inverters: TMIEC – PVH-L1350GR 960V [CEC 2016] 
o Nominal AC voltage: 960 V AC 
o Max DC voltage: 1200 V DC 
o max AC power: 1.35 x 106  Watts AC 
o max DC power: 1.38506 x 106 Watts DC 
o CEC weighted efficiency: 97.72% 
• Racks: one axis tracking racks 
• DC to AC ratio: 1.2 
• Location of the project to retrieve resource information from PSM database 
The useful life of the projects was assumed to be 30 years, following the facility 
life assumption used by LAZARD to estimate the levelized cost of electricity of utility-
scale solar PV projects (LAZARD, 2016). Annual generation modeled by SAM resulted in 
a smaller magnitude than the amount of energy offered in the bid for the Villanueva and 
Don Jose projects. Thus, for this exercise generation modeled by SAM for the Don Jose 
project was adjusted up 5.9% and the generation of the Villanueva project was adjusted 
15% up. These differences in the generation modeled by SAM and the expected generation 
reported by the project sponsor could mean that they over-estimated their ability to generate 
electricity. Nevertheless, the decision of adjusting the generation modeled by SAM to 
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match at least the amount of energy that companies expect to generate, was based on the 
assumption that the companies sponsoring the projects had access to resource data with a 
better quality and resolution than the resource data that SAM software can model. For the 
Ticul project, the generation modeled by SAM was higher than the energy offered in the 
auction. In this case the surplus energy is assumed to be sold at LMPs for the long term 
contract scenario.  
3.1.2 Payments under Long Term Electricity Coverage Contract 
According to the terms of the Long Term Auction Manual, sale offers can be 
indexed to United States Dollars (USD) or to Mexican Pesos upon request of the seller. 
Auction rules provided a formula for the comparison of offers indexed to the two currencies 
reflecting the preference over offers indexed to Pesos (ManualSLP, 2015). The model 
contract published as the basis for the long term auctions provides the formulas that will 
be used to calculate the future payments of energy, CEL’s and Capacity under the long 
term electricity coverage contracts derived from the auctions. 
 
Calculation of Revenues for the First 15 Years 
As mentioned before, the term of the long term coverage contracts is 20 years. 
During the first 15 years, the projects sell electricity and CELs under the long term contract 
terms. During this time, both products are sold at the coupled offered price. These formulas 
do the following: i) update the offered price, made in march 2016, by inflation and variation 
of the peso-dollar exchange rate, to obtain an initial price for the month in which the project 
will start operating, ii) establish the rules to adjust the price for each future month to reflect 
the monthly variation of the exchange rate and inflation, iii) compensate any imbalances, 
iv) apply an hourly adjustment factor that is meant to reflect the fluctuation of the hourly 
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locational marginal prices in the payments under the long term contracts. This adjustment 
factor is a function of the hourly generation and a set of values calculated and published by 
the CENACE. These formulas do not allow opportunities to influence factors in the 
formula, since all variables come from either the amount of product generated and 
delivered, or transparent economic indicators, such as exchange rate and producer index 
prices, published by unrelated public entities.  All formulas used for the calculations of 
payments under the contract are detailed in Appendix B.   
 
Calculation of Revenues from Year 16 to Year 20 
This period corresponds to the last 5 years of the long term contract. From year 16 
to year 20, the projects will no longer be selling energy under the long term contract, so 
electricity sales are calculated using the LMPs for this 5-year period. During this period 
the projects will be selling CELs under the long term contract at the CEL Notional Price 
(PNCEL), defined in the contract with Equation 6: 
(6) PNCELQw = Qxxyz#|}×8:,:::  #w×: ×	 #CEL×20  
Where: PNCELPC: is the notional price of the CEL for that year  
  PAAPC: is the Annual Adjusted Price for that year  
#MWh: is the total amount of MWh of electric energy agreed by the parties to be 
sold per year  
#CEL: is the total amount of CELs agreed by the parties to be sold per year 
Calculation of Revenues for the Last 10 Years of Project Life  
On year 20 the electric energy coverage contract will end. As the project is assumed 
to last 30 years in operation, for the remaining 10 years the project is assumed to be selling 
electricity in the spot market. The revenues for the last 10 years of the project’s useful life 
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are therefore the same as the revenues calculated under the spot market scenario in the 
same years.  
3.2 NET PRESENT VALUE MODEL  
A discounted cash flow analysis was used to estimate the value of the projects and 
compare their profitability under i) the scenario where the project enters the long term 
contract and ii) under a scenario where the project does not enter a long term contract, and 
therefore sells all generated electricity in the short term market at LMPs. For projects to be 
built there has to be an investor willing to provide the required capital. For the investment 
to happen the expected returns need to be attractive enough to the potential investor. The 
projects that are being analyzed have investors who have committed to undertake these 
projects under the provided conditions. Therefore, these projects should have a positive 
Net Present Value (NPV) under long term contract scenario, given the cost of capital of the 
investors. The cost of capital reflects the rate of return expected to be obtained from an 
investment with similar risk characteristics (Titman & Martin, 2016). In this analysis, the 
capital structure of each project is assumed to be comprised by 60% common equity and 
40% debt.  
 
The following steps were taken for each of the three projects to compare their 
profitability under i) long term contract conditions, and ii) short term market conditions: 
1) Calculated the revenue of the projects each year  
2) Estimated the investment costs that the solar PV projects will require 
3) Built a model using Microsoft Excel to calculate the project free cash flows  
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4) Calculated the project Net Present Value for a range of cost of capital 
assumptions and a range of investment cost assumptions, presented in a two-
way data table. 
3.2.1 Revenue of the Projects  
The revenue of the projects under the short term market prices scenario was 
calculated using the weighted average LMPs described in section 3.1 and calculated 
according to Equation 1. The calculations of the revenue under the long term contract the 
revenues that the project will receive under the long term contract were also explained in 
Section 3.1.2. In addition, information about the SAM model, as well as assumptions of 
the PV solar project characteristics were presented in Section 3.1 above.  
 
3.2.2 Estimating Investment Costs of Utility Scale PV Solar Projects  
Total Installed Costs or Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) costs 
add up to $1.40 USD/Watt, and are classified into Direct Costs, and Indirect Costs. As a 
reference, the installed cost used for the PIIRCE model was $1.488 USD/Watt (SENER, 
2016d). According to NRELs model for a 100 MW PV solar farm with one axis tracking 
the EPC is approximately $1.23 USD/Watt in Texas, and the benchmark in the US is $1.49 
USD/Watt as shown in Figure 25 (Fu, et al., 2016). The installed cost assumption made by 
LAZARD in their LCOE analysis is $1.45 USD/Watt (LAZARD, 2016). In reality these 
costs could be even lower since the costs are sourced from 2016 reports and the PV solar 
projects will start construction in 2017. Furthermore, labor costs in Mexico are generally 
lower than in the U.S. The assumptions used for investment costs are summarized in Table 
6 and Table 7. 
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Table 6: Direct Installed Costs 
Direct Capital Costs USD/W 
 Modules  (USD)   $0.64 
Inverters (USD) $0.09 
Racking  (USD) $0.16 
BOS equipment  (USD) $0.10 
Installation labor (USD) $0.16 
EPC & Developer 
overhead (USD) $0.13 
Total Direct Cost $1.28 
Data source: (Fu, et al., 2016) 
 
Table 7: Indirect Installed Costs 
Indirect Capital Costs  USD/W 
Permitting $0.01 
Grid Interconnection $0.03 
Engineering and development overhead $0.05 
Land prep and transmission $0.02 
Land Costs (estimated by comparables) ~ $0.1 
Total Indirect Cost (USD/W) $0.12 
 
Data Source: (Fu, et al., 2016) 
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Figure 25: Q1 Benchmark utility scale PV solar total cost (EPC + developer) 2016 
USD/Wdc 
Source: NREL (Fu, et al., 2016) 
 
The land acquisition cost was estimated using real state valuation through market 
comparables. The project assumes purchasing the land at the beginning of the project and 
selling it at the end. This approach is adopted for the property (land, and site improvement), 
which are commonly transacted in the market, and therefore market data and transactions 
records of them are readily available for comparison. The process consisted of three steps: 
i) identify lands that are similar in area, location, shape and surface to the land required, 
and ii) estimate an average value per square meter according to the comparable example 
found, and iii) multiply the average value per square meter times the area in square meters 
needed for the project. 
 
 49 
3.2.3 Modeling Project Free Cash Flows and Equity Free Cash Flows 
Operation and Maintenance costs were considered to be $12 USD/KW (LAZARD, 
2016). The project Free Cash Flows (FCF) were modeled in Microsoft Excel and calculated 
as follows (Titman & Martin, 2016, pp. 24-25): 
 
Revenue 
less: Operations & Maintenance Costs 
less: Transmission and operation costs 
less: Depreciation expense / virtual expense 
equals: Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
less: Taxes (IVA and ISR)  
equals: Net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) 
plus: Depreciation Expense / virtual expenses 
less: Capital Expenditures (CAPEX / Investment outlays) 
equals: Project FCF 
less: after tax interest and principal payments to creditors 
equals: Equity FCF 
 
With respect to taxes, the project is subject to the federal income tax (ISR) of 30%. 
Under the ISR law 100% of investment expenses, made of machinery and equipment, and 
related installation costs, can be depreciated in the first year of operations of renewable 
generation projects. Any negative taxable income can be carried over to the next year until 
the project reaches the tenth year (ISR DOF, 2016).  In addition, the project pays the federal 
sale tax (IVA). Under the long term contract rules, the IVA will be paid in addition to the 
adjusted offer price, so it does not impact the project. Nevertheless, the IVA paid for the 
purchase of the equipment and machinery can be deducted from the IVA liability, and the 
Ministry of Finance (SHCP) returns the IVA in favor within six months of the tax return 
report.  
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3.2.5 Calculating Project Net Present Value (NPV)  
Lastly, a discounted cash flow analysis of the projects was performed to compare 
the value of the project under the two described scenarios, and to evaluate if the projects 
could be financially feasible under the scenario where they sell energy only at market 
prices. The discounted cash flows analysis consists in bringing all future cash flows of the 
project to year zero and can be denoted as (7): 
 
(7)   Project	value	d6: = 	`bZfd	(;fb^d	bl	fg/dga)d6;   
The Project Value at t=0 in equation (20) is the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
project. If the NPV were negative under the second scenario, companies would need to 
charge a premium over the short term marker price, or LMP, to achieve a positive NPV 
though the sale of CELs.  
 
The discount rate, or cost of capital, required for the long term contract scenario 
could be lower than the discount rate for the short term market prices scenario, because the 
lack of a long term contract increases the revenue risk, and therefore increases the cost of 
capital. The long term contract provides certainty for energy sales and prices. The Brattle 
Group states in a report on importance of long term contracts for renewable project 
development that “increased price certainty for renewable energy projects reduces risk to 
the project’s lenders and investors and thereby reduces the cost of capital for the project”. 
It also states that without the price certainty provided by a long term power purchase 
agreement “a renewable energy project (all else equal) will attract less and more costly 
debt and more costly equity than traditional power project operating in the same wholesale 
power market” (Weiss & Sarro, 2013). In addition, Mexico’s electricity market is new, 
which can create information problems and uncertainty about risks. Uncertainty about risks 
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could prevent both lenders and investors from investing, or at least increase their required 
rates of return (Weiss & Sarro, 2013). It could be that investments in this types of projects 
are only possible with the presence of a long term contract that enables investors to 
overcome uncertainty and risk avoidance. To examine the effect of the price certainty on 
the value of the project, the range of discount rate values used to calculate the NPV for the 
short term market prices scenario is 100 basis points higher than the discount rates for the 
long term contract scenario.  
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Chapter 4.  Results 
4.1 RESULTS FROM REVENUE MODEL 
4.1.1 Don Jose PV Solar Project 
The projected average contract price for the Don Jose project is generally lower 
than the projected weighted average LMPs. This is true for all years except for a five-year 
period when the project is being paid only for CELs at their nominal value under the 
contract, and selling electricity at LMP price (Figure 26). The average present value of the 
difference between the projected weighted average LMP and the projected average contract 
price is -$1.34 USD/MWh. This present value was calculated using the social rate used to 
evaluate the social profitability of public investments in Mexico. This means that there was 
no overprice paid per MWh under the contract, on the contrary, the short term market 
would have paid a present value of $1.34 USD more per MWh. 
 
 
Figure 26: Projected weighted average LMP vs projected contract price for Don José 
project.  
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4.1.2 Villanueva PV Solar Project 
As can be seen in Figure 27, the projected contract price is also generally lower 
than the projected weighted average LMPs. In this case, the average present value of the 
difference between the projected weighted average LMP and the projected average contract 
price is -$4.03 USD/MWh. The short term market would have paid a value of $4.03 USD 
more per MWh than what will be paid under the long term contract.  
 
 
Figure 27: Projected weighted average LMP vs projected contract price for Villanueva 
project.  
4.1.3 Ticul 1PV Solar Project 
In the Ticul project, LMPs start lower than long term contract prices in the first few 
years (Figure 28). Today’s value of the difference between the projected weighted average 
LMP and the projected average contract price is $1.29 USD/MWh. In this case there is a 
small premium over the market rate. Therefore, the cost of the policies for this project 
under long term contract conditions, which could be conceptualized the CEL value under 
the contract, is equivalent to at least $1.29 USD/ MWh. 
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As explained in Section 3.2.5, if the project were to be implemented under the 
scenario where the project sells only at short term market prices, a higher discount rate than 
the one used for the long contract scenario could have been required. Assuming an 
increment of 100 basis points in the discount rate for the short term market prices scenario, 
the project would have required an increment in revenues of 7.6% to have a NPV equal to 
zero, which would imply a premium over the weighted average LMPs of at least $1.49 
USD/MWh. 
Looking at these results it can be concluded that the implemented policies are 
achieving savings for the customer, since prices under long term contracts for the Don José 
and the Villanueva projects are on average lower than market prices. In addition, for the 
Ticul project the application of the long term contracts coupled with the CEL incentives 
most likely reduced the cost of capital required to make this investment, allowing for a 
slight reduction in the required premium over the LMP price. Based on this assumption, 
we can say that the long term contract auction strategy made the provision of PV solar 
energy cheaper than what it would have been through the CEL policy alone.  
 
 
Figure 28: Projected weighted average LMP vs projected contract price for Ticul project. 
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4.2 RESULTS FROM NET PRESENT VALUE MODEL 
A discounted cash flow analysis was made to compare the profitability of the 
projects under the long term contract scenario, and under short term market prices scenario. 
This analysis also helped evaluate the impacts of the implemented policies on investors.  
We have established previously that the fact that the projects are taking place, under the 
long term contract scheme, means that investors consider this project to be profitable. In 
addition, the Don Jose and Villanueva projected short term market revenues are higher than 
projected long contract revenues. These facts could lead us to think that a premium over 
the short term market prices was not needed for the economic feasibility of the projects. 
This is not necessarily true because the project could have been subject to a higher risk 
without the long term contract than with it, since there is no guarantee of selling the energy 
and the is no contract to reduce the uncertainty of the sale price. This higher risk could 
result in a higher discount rate, which reduces the net present value of the project, and 
could make it negative. Long Term contracts reduce price uncertainty and reduce the 
investor’s required rate of return, as well as the cost of debt. 
Lower costs of capital can benefit developers by increasing the project value, but 
also allows them to charge lower prices. This in turn benefits customers. The new 
regulation is effectively requiring that a group of technologies provide a portion of the 
demanded electricity, even if cheaper options exist. Whatever the size of the overprice 
needed (if any) to accommodate these technologies, a long term contract scheme can help 
reduce it. Furthermore, the bidding process carried out by the wholesale market operator, 
where large amounts of energy can be publicly auctioned at the same time, provides the 
opportunity to accesses a large universe of investors and therefore more competitive prices 
for this long term contracts. There will be additional collateral benefits from the auction 
process, derived from the publication of information and stakeholder engagement that the 
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process implies. Information generated around the auction processes and spaces for 
discussion of issues, such as information sessions and training sessions, will accelerate the 
investors’ process of getting to know the new market rules and market environment, 
helping to the reduction of perceived risk. 
To assess the impacts of potential reduction of the cost of capital, net present values 
were obtained for several combinations of project discount rates and investment costs, and 
are shown in the tables below. In the two-way data tables that show the net present value 
of the projects under the scenario of sales at short term market prices, the discount rates 
range reflects an additional spread of 100 basis points over the discount rates used for the 
long term contract scenario.  
  
4.2.1 Don Jose PV Solar Project 
Looking at table Table 8 and Table 9 it can be seen that the net present values of 
the Don José project under long term contracts are lower than the value under the short 
term market scenario that has a 100 basis points spread over the discount rate. In contrast, 
when the spread is 150 basis points, the NPV of the project under the contract is higher 
than the NPV of the project under the short term market prices scenario. The breakeven 
point is at 137 basis points. When the incremental risk from the lack of price certainty 
translates into a spread higher than 137 basis points in the cost of capital, it can be said that 
the long term contract results in higher value of projects for the investor. These break-even 
points can be seen in  
Table 10. For example, for a 1.4 USD/Watt investment cost, the policy will have 
been favorable for the investor if the increase on the project discount rates due to the lack 
of a long term contract were more than 174 basis points. This results indicate that the long 
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term contracts auction policy is most likely increasing the value of the projects to the 
investors, even if sales under short term market prices are expected to be higher than sales 
under long term contracts.   
 
Table 8: Don José project net present value under long term contract. 
 
 
Table 9: Don José project net present value under short term market prices. 
 
Table 10: Don José project internal rate of return under long term contract and under 
short term market conditions. 
 
44,381,830.03$					 1.5 1.4 1.23 1.14 1
10.00% 48,702,086.05$					 68,460,714.58$					 102,050,383.08$			 119,833,148.75$														 147,495,228.69$						
10.50% 34,265,972.97$					 53,982,027.42$					 87,499,319.98$					 105,243,768.99$														 132,846,245.22$						
11.00% 20,888,708.81$					 40,562,572.73$					 74,008,141.41$					 91,714,618.94$																	 119,258,028.44$						
11.50% 8,473,244.65$							 28,105,296.44$					 61,479,784.49$					 79,148,631.10$																	 106,633,503.61$						
12.00% (3,067,239.94)$						 16,523,373.04$					 49,827,415.10$					 67,458,966.78$																	 94,885,824.95$								
12.50% (13,810,520.32)$				 5,739,022.19$							 38,973,244.46$					 56,567,832.72$																	 83,937,192.24$								
13.00% (23,826,363.47)$				 (4,317,527.97)$						 28,847,492.37$					 46,405,444.32$																	 73,717,814.02$								
13.50% (33,177,437.32)$				 (13,708,950.18)$				 19,387,477.96$					 36,909,116.39$																	 64,164,998.38$								
Installed	Cost
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	R
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e
78,435,934.41$					 1.5 1.4 1.23 1.14 1
11.00% 54,583,340.27$					 74,257,204.20$					 107,702,772.87$			 125,409,250.41$														 152,952,659.90$						
11.50% 40,856,488.12$					 60,488,539.91$					 93,863,027.96$					 111,531,874.57$														 139,016,747.08$						
12.00% 28,056,850.04$					 47,647,463.01$					 80,951,505.08$					 98,583,056.76$																	 126,009,914.93$						
12.50% 16,104,874.21$					 35,654,416.73$					 68,888,638.99$					 86,483,227.25$																	 113,852,586.77$						
13.00% 4,929,022.60$							 24,437,858.10$					 57,602,878.44$					 75,160,830.39$																	 102,473,200.09$						
13.50% (5,535,128.89)$						 13,933,358.25$					 47,029,786.39$					 64,551,424.82$																	 91,807,306.81$								
14.00% (15,345,680.81)$				 4,082,811.91$							 37,111,249.52$					 54,596,892.96$																	 81,796,782.75$								
14.50% (24,555,105.59)$				 (5,166,258.01)$						 27,794,782.88$					 45,244,745.70$																	 72,389,132.31$								
Installed	Cost
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sc
ou
nt
	R
at
e
Investment	Cost	
(USD/Watt)
Project	IRR	short	
term	market	(i)
Project	IRR	under	long	
term	contract	(ii)
Difference	(i	-	ii)
14%
1.50 13.23% 11.86% 1.37%
1.40 14.22% 12.78% 1.44%
1.23 16.20% 14.64% 1.56%
1.14 17.45% 15.82% 1.63%
1.00 19.78% 18.04% 1.74%
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4.2.2 Villanueva PV Solar Project 
For the Villanueva project the numbers are more extreme. The value of the project 
under long term contract scenario is much lower than under the short term market prices 
scenario (Table 11 and Table 12). For example, the increment in discount rate derived from 
the lack of a long term contract would have to be above 490 basis points for the 1.4 
USD/Watt project to be more valuable under a long term contract, than under the short 
term market prices (Table 14). If that spread is in reality smaller, the investors may have 
chosen to bid into a long term contract anyway, because the mandate made to suppliers to 
go on long term electricity supply contracts highly reduces the space for short term market 
demand outside this structure.  
Table 11: Villanueva project net present value under long term contract. 
 
 
Table 12: Villanueva project net present value under short term market prices. 
 
######## 1.5 1.4 1.23 1.14 1
10.00% 32,645,889.57$					 64,145,889.57$					 117,695,889.57$			 146,045,889.57$														 190,145,889.57$						
10.50% 9,943,553.19$							 41,375,679.89$					 94,810,295.27$					 123,099,209.30$														 167,104,186.67$						
11.00% (10,994,855.81)$				 20,370,009.05$					 73,690,279.33$					 101,918,657.70$														 145,829,468.51$						
11.50% (30,336,912.14)$				 961,294.14$											 54,168,244.81$					 82,336,630.46$																	 126,154,119.25$						
12.00% (48,232,142.54)$				 (16,999,999.68)$				 36,094,643.18$					 64,203,571.75$																	 107,928,571.75$						
12.50% (64,814,141.69)$				 (33,647,475.03)$				 19,335,858.31$					 47,385,858.31$																	 91,019,191.64$								
13.00% (80,202,423.73)$				 (49,100,653.82)$				 3,772,355.03$							 31,763,947.95$																	 75,306,425.83$								
13.50% (94,504,044.02)$				 (63,466,599.08)$				 (10,702,942.69)$				 17,230,757.75$																	 60,683,180.65$								
Di
sc
ou
nt
	R
at
e
Installed	Costs
######## 1.5 1.4 1.23 1.14 1
0.12$																																											 11.00% 172,170,843.12$			 203,535,707.99$			 256,855,978.26$			 285,084,356.64$														 328,995,167.45$						
0.13$																																											 11.50% 146,836,365.00$			 178,134,571.27$			 231,341,521.95$			 259,509,907.60$														 303,327,396.39$						
0.13$																																											 12.00% 123,205,866.53$			 154,438,009.39$			 207,532,652.25$			 235,641,580.82$														 279,366,580.82$						
0.14$																																											 12.50% 101,133,218.39$			 132,299,885.06$			 185,283,218.39$			 213,333,218.39$														 256,966,551.73$						
0.14$																																											 13.00% 80,487,011.19$					 111,588,781.10$			 164,461,789.95$			 192,453,382.87$														 235,995,860.75$						
0.15$																																											 13.50% 61,148,902.85$					 92,186,347.78$					 144,950,004.17$			 172,883,704.61$														 216,336,127.52$						
0.15$																																											 14.00% 43,012,166.59$					 73,985,850.80$					 126,641,113.96$			 154,517,429.75$														 197,880,587.64$						
0.16$																																											 14.50% 25,980,413.70$					 56,890,894.05$					 109,438,710.64$			 137,258,142.96$														 180,532,815.45$						
Di
sc
ou
nt
	R
at
e
Installed	Costs
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Table 13: Villanueva project internal rate of return under short term market and under 
long term contract conditions. 
 
 
4.2.3 Ticul 1PV Solar Project 
The Ticul project is in a different situation than the previous two projects. When 
comparing Table 14 and Table 15, the value of the project is considerably lower under 
market prices than under long term contract. The results shown in Table 15 indicate that 
this project needed the CEL requirement policy and a premium over the short term market 
price to be financially viable, unless the investment costs are in the lower extreme of the 
range.  
The internal rate of return under the short term market prices scenario is 
consistently lower than under the long term contract scenario (Table 16). This fact implies 
that revenues under short term market prices would need to be higher than the prices under 
the long term contract for the project to have a positive net present value. This result also 
indicates that having generation from this technology in this price zone requires a premium 
over the short term market price, impacting consumers negatively. The average LMP in the 
Merida price zone (corresponding to Ticul) is higher than the average LMP for the La 
Laguna price zone (Villanueva). Thus, the need of a premium over the projected LMPs and 
the lower value of this project with respect to the others can be attributed to the lower 
resource potential of the area.  
Investment	Cost	
(USD/Watt)
Project	IRR	short	
term	market	(i)
Project	IRR	under	
long	term	contract	(ii)
Difference	(i	-	ii)
16%
1.50 15.33% 10.73% 4.59%
1.40 16.42% 11.53% 4.90%
1.23 18.63% 13.13% 5.50%
1.14 20.02% 14.14% 5.88%
1.00 22.61% 16.04% 6.57%
 60 
Table 14: Ticul project net present value under long term contract. 
 
Table 15: Ticul project net present value under short term market prices. 
 
Table 16: Ticul project internal rate of return under short term market and under long 
term contract conditions. 
  
2,625,716.87$				 1.5 1.4 1.23 1.14 1
0.11$																																																																										 10.00% 1,697,254.79										 49,424,527.52							 130,560,891.15					 173,515,436.61																	 240,333,618.43								
10.50% (26,523,491.71)						 21,100,942.68							 102,062,481.14					 144,924,472.09																	 211,598,680.24								
11.00% (52,768,170.51)						 (5,245,647.98)								 75,542,640.30							 118,312,910.57																	 184,844,442.11								
11.50% (77,211,340.92)						 (29,789,816.26)						 50,826,775.67							 93,506,147.87																			 159,896,282.40								
12.00% (100,009,599.54)				 (52,688,170.97)						 27,758,257.60							 70,347,543.32																			 136,597,543.32								
12.50% (121,303,627.79)				 (74,081,405.56)						 6,196,372.21										 48,696,372.21																			 114,807,483.33								
13.00% (141,219,988.00)				 (94,096,094.19)						 (13,985,474.72)						 28,426,029.70																			 94,399,481.03										
13.50% (159,872,700.80)				 (112,846,269.09)				 (32,901,335.17)						 9,422,453.38																					 75,259,457.79										
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Installed	Cost
################ 1.5 1.4 1.23 1.14 1
0.12$																																																																										 11.00% (110,223,776.09)				 (62,701,253.57)						 18,087,034.72							 60,857,304.99																			 127,388,836.52								
0.13$																																																																										 11.50% (133,252,972.60)				 (85,831,447.93)						 (5,214,856.00)								 37,464,516.19																			 103,854,650.72								
0.13$																																																																										 12.00% (154,716,019.96)				 (107,394,591.39)				 (26,948,162.82)						 15,641,122.89																			 81,891,122.89										
0.14$																																																																										 12.50% (174,747,094.73)				 (127,524,872.51)				 (47,247,094.73)						 (4,747,094.73)																				 61,364,016.38										
0.14$																																																																										 13.00% (193,466,871.81)				 (146,342,978.00)				 (66,232,358.53)						 (23,820,854.11)																		 42,152,597.22										
0.15$																																																																										 13.50% (210,984,039.59)				 (163,957,607.87)				 (84,012,673.95)						 (41,688,885.40)																		 24,148,119.00										
0.15$																																																																										 14.00% (227,396,631.15)				 (180,466,806.59)				 (100,686,104.84)				 (58,449,262.73)																		 7,252,491.66													
0.16$																																																																										 14.50% (242,793,195.24)				 (195,959,134.10)				 (116,341,230.17)				 (74,190,575.15)																		 (8,622,889.56)											
Di
sc
ou
t	R
at
e
Installed	Cost
Investment	Cost	
(USD/Watt)
Project	IRR	short	
term	market	(i)
Project	IRR	under	
long	term	contract	
(ii)
10%
1.50 9.01% 10.03%
1.40 9.80% 10.90%
1.23 11.39% 12.65%
1.14 12.38% 13.76%
1.00 14.22% 15.83%
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
Mexico has recently enacted energy policies that incentivize the generation of 
electricity through clean generation technologies. These policies are being implemented 
mainly through the CEL requirements and long term contract obligations that electricity 
suppliers will be subject to starting in 2018. These policies have already resulted in long 
term electricity supply contracts for new clean projects that add up to 3,272 MW of 
installed capacity.  
The results of this research suggest that the impact of the implemented policies on 
customers will be positive overall when looking at these three cases. Furthermore, benefits 
are potentially being shared by both customers and investors. First, the decrease in 
electricity wholesale prices for the Villanueva and Don José projects, that represent 1.5 
GWh of generation per year, is greater than the increment in prices for the Ticul project, 
that represents 0.98 GWh of generation per year. This benefit was achieved thanks to the 
combination of the long term contract auctions with the CEL requirements, which was 
successful in protecting the customers from higher increments in electricity prices. On the 
side of the investor, while the long term contracts in some cases curbs the potential value 
of the projects for investors given the currently high LMPs (Villanueva project case), it can 
also make projects more valuable to investors through the reduction of price uncertainty 
(Don Jose project case). It also helped achieve a positive value for investors in areas where 
the resource has a lower generation potential, while minimizing the price increment needed 
to procure generation from this technology though the auction mechanism (Ticul project 
case).  
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5. 1 FUTURE WORK AND SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY 
For future work an equity tax structure could be included in this analysis. Tax 
equity structures are not being used in Mexico yet. A tax equity structure is a financing 
tool that helps developers, that usually don’t have enough tax liability, use the tax benefits 
available. The most common structure is the partnership flip. In a partnership flip a tax 
equity investor joins the sponsor as a partner to own a renewable energy project. The 
partnership allocates most of the taxable income and loss to the tax equity investor during 
the initial years of the project life (e.g. 99%), until the investor reaches a target yield. After 
that target is reached, the tax equity investor’s share of income and loss drops to a small 
percentage, such as 5%, point from which the sponsor receives the majority of income and 
loss. The sponsor usually has an option to buy the investor’s share after the flip (Martin, 
2015). This type of structure could help projects to take full advantage of the ISR tax 
deduction benefit available for renewable generation projects.  
Future research could include the modeling of a tax equity structure in the NPV 
analysis, to assess how this structures could increase the project value for investors, and if 
their use could help lower sale prices further.  Additionally, the analysis made with the 
revenue model could be applied to all projects from different technologies that have won 
contracts through the long term auctions, for a more exhaustive assessment of the policies’ 
impact on wholesale prices. This research only considers direct economic impacts on 
consumers and investors, omitting environmental and health benefits, as well as indirect 
economic benefits that could come from climate change mitigation.  This research could 
be made more robust if these positive externalities were taken into account. 
Furthermore, sources of uncertainty could be considered in future work. The 
results of this research depend on several assumptions, and are therefore subject to 
uncertainty. The following sources of uncertainty are identified: 
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1) On revenue and estimated wholesale prices:  
• For estimation of short term market sales there is uncertainty from the 
underlying assumptions of the LMPs, such as fuel price projections, investment 
cost, and discount rate assumptions used in the PIIRCE Model. A sensibility 
analysis could be done to assess how different values of this parameters could 
affect the results. An optimization model that includes transmission constraints, 
such as the one used to obtain the PIIRCE, would have to be performed for 
different scenarios that vary these assumptions. This could be done in a software 
such as PLEXOS.  Then, LMPs would have to be calculated for the different 
projections of installed capacity derived from those models.  
• For long term contract sales most uncertainty comes from projections of 
inflation and exchange rate. The formula of the payments under the long term 
contracts has a component dependent on the LMPs, but this component only 
represents around 0.0216 % of the revenue value. 
• For both scenarios there is uncertainty in the generation projections, since this 
is a variable resource that depends on weather. SAM only provides one sample 
year of generation for these locations. Historical data, with better resolution, 
and from various weather stations would be required to estimate the probability 
distribution of the global horizontal irradiance. Then confidence intervals for 
the generation of the projects could be calculated. This could help determine if 
the Villanueva and Don Jose project sponsors overestimated the generation of 
the projects.  
2) On valuation of projects: In addition to the uncertainty that comes from revenue 
estimation, the conclusions depend on the specific characteristics of the investors, 
since they have discount rates that reflect their systematic risk, and could potentially 
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incur in different investment costs. Net present value of projects is very sensitive 
to both of these values. This factors were considered in this analysis as a sensibility 
analysis, calculating the NPV of the projects for a range of discount rate and 
investment cost values. 
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Appendix A 
  
Data source: Data bases PIIRCE 2016-2030 (SENER, 2016c) 
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Appendix B 
Since the sale offers studied in this research were indexed to US dollars, the rules 
for adjusting the price at the operations start date or Initial Price are estimated with 
Equations 6 to 11 (Contract, 2015): 
(1)     	PI = PO×FI 
(2)      FI = FTC×0.70 + (FTC×FIUS×0.20) + (FIMX×0.10) (3)    FTC = 	 wzw 		
(4)    FTC = 	 wzw  
(5)   FIUS = 	QQzQQ  
(6)   FIMX = 	 OPQQzOPQQ  
where PI: Initial Price (or start price) 
PO: Offered Price  
FI: Initial Factor (multiplier that updates the offered price made in march 2016 by 
the inflation and variations in exchange rate from that date to the date of start of 
operations 
FTC: Adjustment factor for the FIX Exchange rate Peso/Dollar.  
FIUS: Inflation adjustment factor in the United States 
FIMX: Inflation adjustment factor in Mexico  
TC0: Is the Peso / Dollar FIX exchange rate published by the Bank of Mexico on 
the fifth business day prior to the date of receipt of the sale offer by CENACE. 
TCFOC: Is the average of the Peso / Dollar FIX Exchange rate published by the Bank 
of Mexico during all the days of the calendar month prior to the date of 
commercial operation. 
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USPP0: Is the USPP corresponding to the calendar month prior to the date of receipt 
of the Sale Offer by CENACE. 
USPPFOC: Is the USPP corresponding to the last available month prior to the date of 
commercial operation. 
INPP0: National Producer Price Index (Mexico) from previous the month to the date 
of the reception of the sale offer 
INPPFOC: National Producer Price Index from the month previous to the date of 
commercial operation. 
The monthly price is updated to reflect the variation of the exchange rate, and 
inflation according to the electricity coverage contract using Equations 7 to 11 (Contract, 
2015): 
(7)   PAM = PI×FAM 
(8) FAM = FTC×0.70 + (FTC×FIUS×0.20) + (FIMX×0.10) 
(9)   FTC = 	 wSTwz  
(10)   FIUS = 	QQSTQQz  (11)   FIMX = 	 OPQQSTOPQQz 	
where PAMm: is the Adjusted Monthly Price for month m 
 PI: initial price 
 FAMm: monthly adjustment factor for month m  
 FTCm: adjustment factor for the FIX Peso/Dollar exchange rate for month m  
 
FIUSm: adjustment factor for the inflation in the United States of America for 
month m 
FIMXm: is the adjustment factor for inflation in México for month m  
TCm-1: is the average of the FIX Peso/Dollar exchange rate published by the Bank 
of Mexico during all the days of the month prior to the month m 
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TCFOC:  is the average of the FIX Peso/Dollar exchange rate published by the Bank 
of Mexico during all the days of the calendar month prior to the date of 
commercial operation 
USPPm-1: is the U.S. Producer Price Index (USPP) corresponding to the last 
available calendar month prior to month m 
USPPFOC: is the USPP corresponding to the calendar month prior to the date of 
commercial operation 
INPPm-1:  is the INPP corresponding to the calendar month prior to the month m 
INPPFOC: is the INPP corresponding to the calendar month prior to the date of 
commercial operation 
Monthly payments conceptually correspond to one twelfth of the offered price. The 
amount of each monthly payment under the contract is estimated using Equation 12 
(Contract, 2015): 
(12)  Payment	M = Qx|#¢£¤2¥yz + AMDCEL + AMDEE + PMAH + B 
where Payment Mm: is the monthly payment for the calendar month m. 
  PAMm :is the Adjusted Monthly Price for the calendar month m  
  #monthsPC: is the total number of calendar months covered in the year to which 
the calendar month belongs. 
AMDCELm: is the Monthly Adjustment for CEL Imbalances for the calendar month 
m  
AMDEEm: is the Monthly Adjustment for Imbalances of electrical energy for the 
calendar month m  
PMAHm: it is the monthly payment that corresponds to the hourly adjustment 
calculated using the Hourly Adjustment Factor (FAH).  
Bm: bonus payments that correspond to transmission and operation fees for the 
calendar month m 
For the purposes of this research, the imbalance adjustments (AMDCELm and 
AMDEEm) are assumed to be net zero each year. In addition, the transmission and 
distribution fees will not be included in the analysis since the project will disburse these 
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fees in each period it receives them. Other rules that are included in the contract, such as 
penalties for under-delivery of energy, and delivery of energy under negative market 
prices, are not included in the analysis.  It is assumed that there will be no curtailment of 
energy scenarios, and no penalties for deficit generation.  
The PMAHm is meant to reflect the fluctuations of the LMPs hour by hour. This 
payment is calculated with Equation 13 (Contract, 2015): 
(13) PMAH = 	 EP2,©,×	FAH2,ª26;«©©6¬©  
where  PMAHm: is the monthly payment for Hourly Adjustment for the calendar month m 
in Pesos (using the average FIX Peso / Dollar Exchange rate published by the Bank 
of Mexico during all days of the calendar month prior to the calendar month m) 
  pd: is the first day of the calendar month m. 
  Ud: is the last day of the calendar month m. 
EPh,d,m: is the energy produced at the hour h of the day d of the calendar month m. 
FAHh,m: is the hourly adjustment factor corresponding to the hour h of the average 
day of the calendar month m, according to the Hourly Adjustment 
Factors (FAHs) released by CENACE for the Long Term Auction 2015. 
In case of requiring data for years after those included in such FAHs, 
those corresponding to the last year are to be used.  
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